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I. INTRODUCTION
Transition of the former communist countries to the market economy is
undoubtedly one of the key phenomena of the last decade of twentieth
century. Among these countries, Russia obviously occupies an out-
standing position. Russian economy is the largest of these, so the per-
spectives of reforms in this country are of global significance. But Rus-
sia also had the longest experience of planned economy, which
reasonably allows to expect the transitional process to be most compli-
cated here. Indeed, a three-generation life experience of the communist
economy resulted in an establishment of the most rigid and strong
authoritarian system of economic institutions and organizations. The
mere system failed, but such an experience apparently hurts the proc-
ess of transition to the modern free market economy, for it had influ-
enced not only the habits and style of economic activities, but also the
perception of economic reality by Russians agents. The last conjecture
is reinforced by the fact that the collapse of the communist system was
very fast and sharp in comparison to the previous period, so that many
people may felt lost in an environment completely unknown to them.
Yet another reason for possible troubles on the way of the efficient mar-
ket system formation resides in the features that are typically ascribed
to the Russian mentality. A «mysterious Russian soul» is often expected
to manifest itself in a fairly unpredictable way, which led some people to
argue that the market system is not convenient for Russia. An adjacent
traditionalist argument states that the population of Russia, being lo-
cated in-between the East and the West, is naturally endowed with ex-
ceptionally particular spirit and mentality, which, at the extreme, is to in-
validate the patterns of individual behaviour commonly observed and
recognised as cornerstones of modern market economies.
Are these expectations well-grounded? The present paper provides
some evidence which suggests that the answer to that question is no, to
some extent at least. Our experimental work is focused on rather narrow
topic - individual attitudes toward risk; but its results show that little if
any serious difference exists between Russian subjects and the rest of
the world in that particular respect. Of course, this conclusion is limited
not only to the field of comparison, but also to the subject sample. To
enhance calibration of results we draw our conclusions on the basis of
samples similar to those involved in analogous experiments in both
Western and Eastern countries,- namely, to undergraduate students in
economics. On the other hand, as long as our evidence concerns only
risk attitudes, it is difficult to extend the claim «we all are similar» to
Russians in a large variety of institutional settings. Some insights into
these later are provided in the second part of our paper, dedicated to
public choice experiments.
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In this latter case some differences reported below may at best require
cultural explanations, whereas the risky choice evidence might address a
number of questions important for economic theory. In particular, experi-
ments may be insightful to seek for an explanations of some «nonconven-
tional» phenomena met in economies in transition (as well as in developed
market economies). We believe that a thorough investigation of real-life
transitional phenomena has to go beyond the regular study of macroeco-
nomic indicators and forecasts on plausible consequences of particular
economic policies. Not less, if not more important key to the understand-
ing of many transitional phenomena resides in the patterns of individual
behaviour, which were heavily influenced by drastic institutional changes.
A number of features peculiar of transitional epoch (e.g. inefficient re-
structuring and management in many industrial enterprises, propagation
of financial pyramids, uncommon patterns of adjustments in the labour
market) hardly can be understood without a careful look at economic mo-
tivation on the micro level. Traditional methods of applied economic
analysis (collecting statistical data, building and testing particular models)
do not appear to be quite appropriate for a study of real people’s subjec-
tive motivation. It seems that experimental methods are more convenient
to fill this gap.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II, we review the previous
work on risk attitudes. Section III presents and discusses the corre-
sponding Russian evidence, together with some implications. Section IV
describes the basic design and results of public choice experiments,
followed by our experimental evidence. The final section V contains
general conclusions and suggests some implications, theoretical as well
as practical.
II. RISK ATTITUDES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Every citizen of the former USSR was familiar to the claim that one of
the greatest achievements of ‘real socialism’ is the ‘feeling of certainty
in one’s future’, guaranteed to everybody. Indeed, under the previous
system, nearly everybody was eligible to a socially guaranteed minimum,
and this is almost regardless of his or her effort level. By contrast, in
transitional times nearly nobody was guaranteed anything, to some ex-
tent also regardless of effort level. The question is: how individuals who
were subject to such a change, behave toward risk?1
Through this paper «risk» is understood according to the conventional
criterion most widely used in economic theory. Risky environment in ex-
                                               
1 The communist system being expired, no conjecture can be made nowadays as
to which were risk attitudes by the citizens of the former USSR, since life
experience and institutional environment has changed since.
RISK ATTITUDES AND CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY
6
periments is generated by facing subjects with lists of lotteries (risky
prospects) of the type (x, p; y, 1-p), where x and y are outcomes in real
or experimental currency, and p - probability of the favourable out-
come’s occurrence. The baseline (von Neumann-Morgenstern) ex-
pected utility theory predicts or forces the rational individual to choose
one among the offered lotteries according the expected utility criterion:
max E[u(x)] = ∑iu(xi)pi,
where xi is the ith element of a vector of possible outcomes, and pi - the
probability of outcome xi, ∑ipi = 1. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function u, defined up to positive affine transformations, characterises
both the utility of outcome and individual attitudes toward risk. If u is lin-
ear, the individual is said to be risk neutral or expected value maximizer;
individual with concave u would prefer the expected value of a lottery for
sure to the lottery itself, which means risk aversion; convex u means the
reverse, and this is the case of risk seeking (Pratt, 1964). A good deal
of experimentalists’ attention was paid to the tests of necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of the u function with the above
properties (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and in fact, little support
was found to the baseline theory, and probably even less - to its exten-
sions and generalizations (Hey and Orme, 1994). However, these dis-
couraging results do not interfere with the study of risk attitudes per se,
since the latter is rather descriptive in nature: the mere statement of
preferences among lotteries suffices to qualify these as risk-averse or
risk-seeking.
A large body of Western literature is dealing with that particular subject
(e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Payne e.a., 1981; Cohen e.a., 1987;
Tversky and Wakker, 1995, to mention only a few). The commonly ob-
served preference pattern that stems out of this literature reveals risk
aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses when probabilities of high
outcome (by absolute value) are non-negligible, and significant over-
weighing of very small probabilities, which leads to risk seeking for gains
and risk aversion for losses. For instance, a typical amount of money
that is exactly as desirable as the lottery itself, or its certainty equivalent
for two-outcome lottery like (100, p; 0, 1-p)2, might be 40 at p=0.50
and 5 at p=0.01; being equal to -30 at p=0.50 and -10 at p=0.01 when
the outcome of 100 is taken with negative sign. Instead of asking sub-
jects for their certainty equivalents, elicitation of corresponding prob-
abilities or outcomes may be used for the same sake (see Farquhar,
1984 for a review). Alternatively, risk attitudes may be estimated by
revelation of preferred lottery in a pair where one lottery is riskier than
another (usually in the sense of mean preserving spread - Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1970), while the maximum possible gain is higher in the
other.
                                               
2 In what follows lotteries of that sort are labelled standard
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Any meaningful comparison of risk attitudes exhibited by Russian sub-
jects to those observed by Western scholars would make sense as long
as substantial isomorphism is established between experimental condi-
tions in both cases, including satisfaction of saliency, privacy and domi-
nance requirements of experimental design. Two classical cross-cultural
studies were performed in developing countries - rural India (Bing-
swanger, 1982) and urban P.R of China (Kachelmeier and Shehata,
1992). Bingswanger asked about 120 Indian peasants to choose one
out of eight lotteries of the form (H, 0.5; L, 0.5), with H varying from 50
to 200 and L - from 0 to 45, multiplied by 0.01, 0.1 and 1 rupees for
three real, and by 10 - for one imaginary-payoff scale. He found rela-
tively high (up to 1/3) proportion of extremely risk-seeking choices under
low payoff scale, but such a pattern virtually disappeared for higher
payoff scales. This method is rather restrictive since it allows for point
estimates only, and risk aversion measures have to be implicitly imputed
(the author realized this, but he was forced to proceed in that way be-
cause the illiterate peasants failed to understand the alternative equiva-
lents formulation of the task). Kahelmeier and Shehata dealt with more
educated sample of 80 Chinese students, and compared these results
with analogous data obtained using US and Canadian students samples.
They asked subjects to state certainty equivalents (as willingness-to-
accept) for 20 standard lotteries of a form (x, p; 0, 1-p) with x fixed at
low (0.5 or 1 yuan) or high (5 or 10 yuan, respectively) scales, and p
varying from 0.05 to 0.95. To simulate revelation of the true selling
prices, the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM, 1964) procedure was
used. This well-known mechanism consists in announcing the subjects
that their stated selling price will be compared to a random price drawn
from some predetermined uniform distribution. Would the random price
exceed the selling price, the subject receives the random price (not her
stated price) instead of the lottery, while in the opposite case she will
have to play the lottery and to collect its outcome, whatever it will be3. It
is easy to see that the only dominant strategy in this case is to state the
true selling price, since any deviation results in an expected utility loss.
The argument follows the logic of optimal bids in second-price auctions:
suppose the subject’s stated selling price is above the true one. Then
the random number is to fall in-between the true and the stated selling
price with some nonnull probability, and the subject will have to play the
lottery while forgiving the option to collect an amount that exceeds his
                                               
3 BDM mechanism in the above form is used to elicit minimum selling price, or
willingness to accept (WTA). A dual mechanism can be used for the case of
maximum buying price, or willingness to pay (WTP): if the random repurchase
price will be below or at the stated price, the lottery is acquired for the random
price and played; otherwise it expires worthless for the subject.
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true valuation. Conversely, by understating the true valuation an individ-
ual makes it possible for the random number to be larger than the
stated price, but smaller than the true one, which means that the sub-
ject has to collect an amount that is below his valuation. Therefore, the
only dominant strategy under the BDM mechanism is to bid the true
valuation.
This method, while being logically impeccable, is not free of some
drawbacks. First, its efficiency obviously depends on how well the sub-
jects understand it (in fact, the same is true of any other elicitation
mechanism). Second, the interval from which the random price is drawn
was shown to influence the stated prices (Bohm e.a., 1997). Finally,
even theoretically it works exactly as described above if and only if the
subjects are expected utility maximizers in the sense of von Neumann-
Morgenstern. In particular, it is easy to see that the BDM mechanism
defines a two-stage lottery over the final outcomes of the lottery being
assessed, and thus it can be shown to reveal the true valuations pro-
vided the independence (Hold, 1986) or reduction of compound lotteries
(Segal, 1988) axiom of the expected utility theory are not violated. Exis-
tence of a number of generalized expected utility theories that abandon
these axioms gave rise to an extensive critique of the BDM procedure in
the literature, which accused it to lead to the uncontrolled distortions of
individual preferences (e.g. Safra e.a., 1990). However, subsequent ex-
perimental research (e.g., Tversky e.a., 1990) have shown that observed
choice phenomena persisted under alternative elicitation procedures,
and thus the critique of 1980th largely misses its target. In either case,
the intuitively clear BDM procedure probably remains the most popular
elicitation mechanism, so we implemented it in our experiments mostly
for calibration reasons.
Using the certainty equivalents elicited with the BDM mechanism, Ka-
helmeier and Shehata found significant risk seeking on the average for
the probability range below 0.20 or 0.25, but for higher probabilities the
average certainty equivalent was almost precisely equal to the expected
value, revealing risk neutrality. Risk aversion of the Chinese subjects
generally increased with the scale of the game: for instance, a 5 yuan
scale treatment gave persistently more risk-averse assessments than
0.5 yuan scale. This difference disappeared, however, with the North
American subjects (students from Canada and the US who played 25
games with $1 stakes and an additional couple for $20 stakes), where
the two series were nearly identical under both high and low scales. For
calibration sake we choose to take as basic the latter approach, but
supplemented it with pairwise choice tasks, with one lottery in a pair
being more risky than the other. The two formulations can be expected
to give different results for two reasons. First, an assessment through
pairwise choice obviously is truncated by nature in comparison to the
certainty equivalent assessment. Second, any ordering or evaluation
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may be suspect due to the preference reversals phenomenon (Lichten-
stein and Slovic, 1971; Tversky e.a., 1990).
With these caveats in mind, we have chosen the certainty equivalent de-
sign for the baseline experiment, since it is readily comparable to the
previously obtained data. To enhance calibration even further, we tried
to ensure compatibility of subjects’ payoffs. Kahelmeier and Shehata
played in China 25 low-scale and 25 high-scale games for real money,
which was possible since the average monthly income is reported to be
as low as 60 yuan ($15), and so a single 10-yuan bet represented about
1/6 of subjects’ regular income. Our subjects for the analogous experi-
ments were first-year undergraduate Russian students whose regular
monthly income (stipend) was typically about 120,000 roubles ($20),
and normally they cannot be expected to have significant sources of
additional income. Moreover, a structure of their spendings is also simi-
lar to that of Chinese students, rental expenses constituting only a few
percent of total living costs. For financial reasons we did not play every
lottery,- instead, after making their choices, individuals drew two out of
twenty lotteries in both low-scale and high-scale games, and played
them subject to the BDM procedure4. Our subjects apparently had no
difficulties to grasp that the positive outcome in low and high-scale
game was at 2,000 and 20,000 roubles, the latter of these being thus
equal 1/6 of regular income, which made subjects very happy with their
actual wins. Thus, our stakes in real terms were essentially analogous to
those of Chinese 1 and 10-yuan games, albeit our subjects played only
a selection of lotteries they have assessed. Despite this difference, re-
sults obtained by us were essentially very similar to the previous, as will
be seen shortly.
III. RISK ATTITUDES IN RUSSIA: DESIGN AND EVIDENCE
Our experiments were ran in Moscow area during Spring and Fall se-
mesters 1997. Subjects were volunteer 1- and 3-year undergraduate
students recruited through oral advertisement, mostly at the Economic
Faculty of Moscow State University. In addition to these, two sessions
were ran at Higher School of Economics, two more at Moscow Trans-
port Engineer University (MIIT) with 3-year students in civil engineering,
finally, one session was played at Dubna university, region of Moscow,
with local students in economics5.
                                               
4 Another advantage of playing selected lotteries rather than every lottery in the
list is that this method seems to exclude the possibility of significant influence of
wealth effects, which may potentially distort individual preferences.
5 Every experimental session usually contained one to two other cells following
those reported below. Where their contents goes beyond the scope of the
present paper, it will not be discussed here.
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a) Experimental design
All the sessions above were ran in a similar manner. Upon distributing
the general instructions (sample of which is provided in the Appendix 1),
subjects were introduced to the notion of a lottery, and endowed with
separate lists of two-outcome lotteries stated in experimental currency
(francs), e.g. (100, 0.5; 0, 0.5). For ease of perception, each lottery was
accompanied with a pie chart representing probabilities of outcomes. In
the first list, lotteries were arranged in ten pairs, and the subjects had to
select one lottery in each pair they prefer to play. Expected gains within
every pair were similar up to a couple of francs, while variance of out-
comes in one lottery was higher than that in the other, so the former
was riskier . To prevent reasoning by analogy, riskier and safer lotteries
for every pair were actually permutated at random. Prior the choice, the
subjects were informed that after their decisions will be made, two out
of ten pairs of lotteries will be selected at random, and they will have to
play a lottery they preferred in these two pairs. All choices being made,
the experimenter called lotteries consecutively, and the subjects indi-
cate the lotteries to be played for them by raising their hands. Out-
comes were revealed with wooden balls enumerated from 1 to 100 and
contained in an opaque bag. If the number generated was at or below
the low-outcome probability, the subject received the lower payoff; oth-
erwise he or she won. After a sequence of questions no subject appar-
ently found it troublesome to handle with this procedure.
After this was done, the first lists were collected and the subjects re-
ceived the second one containing standard lotteries of a form (100, p;
0, 1-p), as well as some nonstandard two-outcome lotteries (see list of
lotteries in the Appendix 1). Standard lotteries with 20 different p’s
(0.05, 0.10,… 0.90, 0.95, 0.99) were arranged at random, but the
order remained the same through the sessions being reported. The
BDM mechanism was then introduced, including three dry runs to give
subjects a better feeling of its properties. Upon filling the whole list with
certainty equivalents every subject was privately assigned two or three
(depending on the list size) lotteries, and when everybody did so, the
experimenter called lotteries by numbers in turn. Those participants
whose lottery was announced indicate this by raising their hands, and a
random price was been generated with the table of random numbers.
Subject to BDM conditions, a lottery was played as before. Regardless
of the outcome, everybody had to fill in the form reflecting outcomes
and decisions (stated prices).
b) Risk attitudes via certainty equivalents
In total, 186 participants ook part in our experiments; however, only 87
of these were have gone through the experiments on risk attitudes by
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certainty equivalents in standard lotteries, which coincides with sizes of
Chinese and American samples by Kahelmeier and Shehata. Basic fea-
tures of these sessions are provided in table 1.
Table 1. Summary of experimental sessions on risk attitudes
# N Scales Location Incentives CE revelation
1a 34 low MSU money min selling prices
1b 28 high MSU money min selling prices
2 10 low MSU money max buying
prices
3 15 low Dubna prizes min selling prices
4 11 low MIIT prizes min selling prices
5 17 low HSE prizes max buying
prices
Since the first results were highly similar regardless of institutional af-
filiation of the subjects, we choose to concentrate on two treatment
variables. One of these were incentives: although outcomes were
throughout stated in experimental currency (francs), not in real money,
conversion rules differed across samples as it was announced prior to
the beginning of every session. In some sessions, in addition to the par-
ticipation fee of 10,000 roubles, subjects collected actual money gained
as lotteries’ outcome according to the announced exchange rate set at
20 roubles per one franc for the low-scale games. In others, subjects
were to get «valuable prizes for their participation, whose worth will be
directly proportional to the number of francs they will earn»6. The other
variable was a form of certainty equivalent revelation: 60 subjects were
asked to write down their minimum selling price for the lottery they own,
the remaining 27 were to state the maximum price they are ready to pay
for a lottery. At least one session was ran at every possible combination
of each treatment variable, and one more session (session 1b) was
played with the same subjects as session 1a, but under high-scale con-
ditions, with high outcome being 1000 francs instead of 100 for low-
scale conditions.
Upon collecting the certainty equivalents in either form, a natural meas-
ure of risk attitudes is the ratio of average (arithmetic mean or median)
certainty equivalent to the expected value of every lottery. These ratios
for the medians in our experiments (those for means are very similar)
are plotted in Figure 1 for two different samples: one was played for real
money by 34 subjects; another consisted of 26 subjects who played for
                                               
6 Actually, prizes were small stuff of general student use (pens, pencils,
notepads) or Christmas postcards. In the course of the sessions subjects were
given no insight as to what these prizes will be.
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nonmonetary prizes. In addition, the third series for 28 subjects depicts
the same ratio for the high scale lotteries (with 20,000 roubles at stake).
Results of this experiment in China show that CE/EV ratios were at ap-
proximately 3 to 4 for the initial probability values (significant risk-
seekkng), but sharply decreased to the unity since probability of 0.20-
0.25, at which level they remained for the rest of probability range.
Corresponding series for the high-payoff case were consistently below
the former series, indicating higher risk aversion and slightly declining
from about 1.4 to 1.1 for the highest probabilities. Series for North
American subjects were slightly below Chinese series at very low prob-
abilities, and fluctuated between 1.5 and 1 at higher probabilities. High-
scale games in North America were ran either for hypothetical payoffs
or at only one probability level (0.50) with $20 stake. The hypothetical
series nearly coincide with those constructed for low-scale lotteries ob-
tained with these samples (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992).
As Figure 1 convincingly demonstrates, the basic pattern for the Russian
subjects was the same; the risk-seeking in the low probability range co-
incides with the typical pattern of risk preferences. However, the aver-
age CE/EV ratio for the Russian sample lies below the Chinese data,
although they are close to the American samples, being clustered be-
tween 2 and 3 for the lowest value of p. On the other hand, for higher
probabilities, the Russian CE/EV ratio, like the Chinese, was anchored to
1, and, thus, indicated risk seeking for an even narrower range and no
readily discernible risk aversion. The Russian results are distinguished
by (1) the lack of any systematic differences between the low and high
payoff series, at least for probabilities above 0.3, and (2) the somewhat
larger, as compared with the American sample, volatility of the series
obtained from the prize games. This leads to the conclusion that while
Figure 1. Certainty equivalent ratios
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the average risk attitudes of Russian subjects do not generally differ
from those observed worldwide, their preferences for risk, as measured
by certainty equivalents, lie somewhere in-between those observed in
developed and developing countries.
Kachelmeier and Shehata performed some statistical tests con-
cerning relative risk attitudes. First, they quantitatively estimated
the CE/EV ratios for individual certainty equivalents using the fol-
lowing linear regression specification:      .
CETOEV SCALE PROB SUBJECThij h i i j j
j
n
i
= + + + +
=
−
=
∑∑α β β β ε1 2 3
1
1
1
20
where CETOEV is the observed CE/EV ratio, SCALE equals 0 if the ob-
servation comes from the low-scale game, and 1 if it comes from the
high-scale game; PROBi equals 1 if the observation comes from the
lottery with p=i, i=0.05, 0.10,… 0.95, 0.99, and 0 otherwise; and
SUBJECTj equals 1 for observations from subject j, -1 for observations
from subject n7, and 0 otherwise. This regression was estimated using
the sample that played the game for money. The results are presented
in Appendix 2, Table 2.
As the joint F-test shows, the regression is significant overall, and the
correlation coefficients are similar to those observed by Kachelmeier
and Shehata, which ranged from 0.33 to 0.43. The significance of the
regression coefficients for the lower probabilities supports our hypothe-
sis of significant risk-seeking for that range. However, the scale-of-the-
game influence in our case was smaller (Kachelmeier and Shehata ob-
tained a significant coefficient for that variable for the Chinese, but not
for the American sample), and our t-statistics for the higher probabilities
regressors are higher than theirs. Thus, for the Russian sample, the
tendency to anchor certainty equivalents to the expected values in
higher probability lotteries was somewhat more articulated than for the
Chinese one, whereas in the American case risk aversion was even
more pronounced.
These differences in our findings might be interpreted in the following
manner. In a general equilibrium framework, subjects can be reasonably
expected to be risk averse, for otherwise they will trade at an expected
loss, and will shortly become bankrupt. In contrast, this need not be the
case in any single market as long as individual assets are sufficiently di-
versified. Individuals who naturally view experimental lotteries as only one
of their assets (indeed, a very occasional one), may well interpret this
gamble as an amusement rather than earning activity, and thus exhibit
greater risk seeking. However, when the scale of the game increases,
higher incentives push individuals toward a reinterpretation of gambling as
                                               
7 This specification, which is statistically equivalent to the usual coding
(SUBJECTj=1 for jth subject, 0 otherwise), equates the overall regression
intercept with the average of the individual intercepts.
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a real source of income. Risk seeking thus decreases with the payoff type
and scale of the game. At the same time, risk seeking appears to be in-
creasing in the proportion of wealth constituted by the amount at stake.
Thus, as the scale of the game increases from $1 to $10, Russian stu-
dents, for whom $10 amount to about half their monthly income, tend to
engage in risky gambles more readily than their American counterparts,
for whom $10 are no more than a little support towards their monthly al-
lowance, but less readily than the Chinese, for whom this sum constitutes
a much more considerable amount. This factor, or windfall effect, may be
attributed to individuals’ inability to promptly adapt to a sudden increase
in their wealth position. Note that in the low-scale games, the data for all
three countries are remarkably similar.
A complementary confirmation of this conclusion could be obtained with
a t-test of the null hypothesis that individual CE/EV ratios equal 1 (risk-
neutrality) at every probability level. This test was also performed by
Kachelmeier and Shehata, who observed significant risk-seeking for
low-scale low-probability Chinese games, while t-statistics for high-scale
game were mostly insignificant, which again is consistent with risk-
neutrality rather than risk aversion. Analogous tests with our sample
(Appendix 2, Table 3) show that the difference for the low-scale condi-
tion was significant at the 1% level for most low-probability levels (re-
vealing significant risk-seeking), and at the 5% level for the highest
probability levels (risk aversion). In contrast, for the high-scale games,
we can speak of significant risk-seeking only for the three lowest prob-
ability categories, and we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of risk
neutrality for the highest probability levels. Thus again, the fact that risk-
seeking decreases with the scale of the game is consistent with the hy-
pothesis of changing attitudes towards the experiment: it ceases to be
an amusement, and becomes business.
Thus, our data reveal risk seeking over the low probability range but
risk-neutrality thereafter. This result coincides with both the Chinese and
American patterns, implying that «we all are similar» at least in this par-
ticular respect.8. Note that risk seeking at low probabilities coincides
with the conventional empirical findings discussed in section 2, while
risk neutrality stands in contradiction to the usually found risk aversion
at the higher probability levels. Kachelmeier and Shehata tend to explain
the latter discrepancy along the lines of the WTA-WTP discrepancy.
While going against the conventional wisdom of its theoretical equiva-
lence, this WTA-WTP difference has received extensive experimental
                                               
8 One might reason that the country-specific effect is overshadowed by the sub-
jects’ shared educational experience. Indeed, one may speculate that economics
students are "socialized" to similar norms of "rational" behaviour. Responding to
this, however, it might be argued that students  tend to be drawn from among
the most thoughtful and active parts of the population – i.e., the segment of so-
ciety  from which future decision-makers are likely to be recruited. This endows
experiments on students with particular economic meaning.
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support (Kahneman et al., 1990). Figure 2 plots the mean CE/EV ratios
for 60 minimum selling and 27 maximum buying prices for our sample
data. Thin lines denote the patterns of both buying (dashed) and selling
(solid) prices, and bold-faced lines show the average patterns for both
groups. As stated earlier, the mean selling pattern is similar to that for
the median-based general indicator. It is persistently above the mean
buying pattern and, thus, supports the WTA-WTP discrepancy. Moreo-
ver, our design allows for an analogous t-test of the significance of the
CE/EV ratio’s deviation from unity, where the CEs are estimated by
buying prices (Appendix 2, Table 4).
When t-statistis are calculated for a subsample of sessions played under
monetary incentives, in four out of twenty cases the null hypothesis that
the average ratio equals 1 cannot be accepted at the 5% level and risk
aversion was revealed in all cases. An even larger number of t-statistics
become significant for the upper probability range (0.85 and higher) on
the basis of the overall sample of buying prices, which again reveals risk
aversion for that range (Appendix 2, Table 5). Thus, buying price esti-
mation indicates risk aversion, although its range is somewhat narrower
than predicted, being limited to the very high probabilities only.
Yet another regularity tends to support this conclusion: the most con-
clusive evidence for risk aversion was obtained using prize incentives.
According to our results, CE/EV ratios for prize sessions were system-
atically above those obtained in money sessions (again, this comparison
Figure2. Valuations through selling and buying prices
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has not been performed by Kachelmeier and Shehata). In fact, as can
be seen from figure 2, prize patterns are typically above the money
ones. The t-statistic for discrepancies between selling and buying prices
with prize incentives was equal to 2.38 (significant at the 0.02 confi-
dence level). It was much less significant for the money regime (t=1.00,
p=0.32). These findings tend to support another conclusion by the
aforementioned authors, namely that WTA-WTP differences rather than
the increasing relative risk aversion under different incentive regimes,
play the crucial role in determining risk attitudes. However, unlike the
American evidence, Russian data show low to moderate risk aversion
when monetary incentives were introduced.
Nevertheless, our data, in general, not only confirm the basic pattern of
risk preferences, they provide, additional support to the hypothesis that
the WTA-WTP discrepancy, and not incentive regimes, are of primary
importance in determining risk attitudes. MANOVA analysis for our 2×2
factorial design on the basis of average CE/EV ratios for standard lot-
teries shows that the influence of WTA-WTP as a grouping variable was
significant at the 5% level (F=4.31, p<0.04), while that of the incentive
regime was insignificant (F=1.70, p<0.19), as was the interactive effect9.
Thus, all our findings agree with risk preference patterns observed
worldwide, including incentives and WTA-WTP effects. However, we be-
lieve, this finding, in itself, does not suggest that in Russia risk attitudes
in economic applications may be assumed to manifest themselves in the
same way as in developed countries. To mention one point, as in any
other large country, in Russia, the tails of the distribution may well com-
prise millions of people.
c) Pairwise risky choices
As discussed above, the degree of risk aversion may also be experi-
mentally assessed by the frequency with which a riskier lottery is pre-
ferred in a pair with the same expected values over its safer counterpart
in a pair (with risk being measured according to the conventional crite-
ria). The data set for this test was larger than for the previous one, since
in addition to the standard lotteries used in the five sessions discussed
above, two more lottery lists were assessed in seven more sessions.
Lottery lists are provided in Appendix 1; the first of these was used in
two sessions, the second – was used in five, and the third, with stan-
dard lotteries, was used in five. Each list was composed of 10 lottery
pairs, each with equivalent expected returns. One lottery (labeled L) had
a lower variance than the other (labeled M), while M had a higher po-
tential return. The two were randomly ordered in each pair. The pooled
proportions of risk-averse and risk-seeking choices for the 186 subjects
are provided in Table 6.
                                               
9 A similar analysis performed with non-standard lotteries (not reported here)
confirms the same conclusion.
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Table 6. Numbers and proportions of risk averse and risk
seeking choices under different incentives regimes.
Choices Whole sample Money alone Prizes
number % number % number %
averse 637 48.1% 293 48.4% 344 47.8%
seeking 688 51.9% 312 51.6% 376 52.2%
total 1325 100% 605 100% 720 100%
As can be seen from Table 6, the frequencies of risk-averse and risk-
seeking preferences under the two incentive schemes were remarkably
similar. F-tests on the pooled data revealed that the incentive schemes
had no significant effect on the percentage of «risky» choices. Nor did
the type of lottery used or the experiment’s location.
In order to evaluate the factors that may have led subjects to choose
either the riskier or safer lotteries, we used three separate lists (see Ap-
pendix 1). The relevant factors might include (1) the expected gain, (2)
the comparative riskiness (variance), (3) the values of high and low out-
comes within the pair, (4) the probabilities of high and low outcomes,
(5) the presence (or absence) of negative payoffs, and (6) the degree to
which the lottery’s structure can be easily understood without subjective
‘editing’ --- e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, (1979) round the outcome of
28 to 30 or 25).
On the basis of the general sample, we are unable to identify any well-
expressed influence of editing on risk preferences. The first four cases
altogether can be analysed using limited dependent econometric tech-
niques. We estimated the log-likelihood function
L = ∑i [(1-yi)*ln(1-πi) + yi*ln(πi)]
for the random utility model of a form
yi = F(.) + ui
where yi equals either 1 or 0 (such that predicted values of yi are inter-
preted as the probabilities of choosing one of the lotteries), ui is the
(heteroskedastic) error term, and F(.) = F(α+βxi) stands for either the
logit or probit specification of the six possible explanatory variables: high
and low outcomes, their corresponding probabilities, expected values
and standard deviations. Logit estimation of the proportion of risk pref-
erences on the basis of pooled lottery lists 2 and 3 provide no signifi-
cant estimates at all. However, the data may be decomposed in at least
two ways: by lottery lists (2 or 3) and by incentives (money and prizes).
The significant estimates for the logit models are provided in Table 7
(for list 2, 560 observations and prize incentives) and 8 (list 3, 570 ob-
servations and monetary incentives).
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Table 7. Estimates of the logit model for risky lottery preferences, list 2
Regres-
sor
Final
value of
the loss
function
Chi-
squared*
Inter-
cept**
t-test* Slope** t-test*
H 374.04 7.27
(0.006)
0.93
(0.22)
4.23
(0.00)
-0.002
(0.001)
-2.69
(0.01)
pH 368.80 17.75
(0.000)
-0.64
(0.26)
-2.46
(0.02)
3.74
(0.90)
4.15
(0.00)
pL 368.80 17.75
(0.000)
3.09
(0.66)
4.69
(0.00)
-3.74
(0.90)
-4.15
(0.00)
H(prize
s)
295.55 5.67
(0.02)
0.88
(0.24)
3.58
(0.00)
-0.002
(0.001)
-2.37
(0.02)
pH(priz
es)
291.06 14.63
(0.00)
-0.71
(0.29)
-2.40
(0.02)
3.82
(1.01)
3.77
(0.00)
pL(priz
es)
291.06 14.63
(0.00)
3.11
(0.74)
4.19
(0.00)
-3.82
(1.01)
-3.77
(0.00)
Notes: *two-tailed confidence level in parentheses;
          ** standard error of estimate in parentheses
Table 8. Estimates of the logit model for risky lottery preferences, list 3
Regres-
sor
Final
value of
the loss
function
Chi-
squared*
Inter-
cept**
t-test* Slope** t-test*
H(mon
ey)
198.
19
5.61
(0.01)
1.01
(0.45)
2.24
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.00)
-2.35
(0.02)
L(mon
ey)
193.
81
14.38
(0.00)
0.27
(0.14)
1.96
(0.06)
0.15
(0.04)
3.56
(0.00)
EV(mo
ney)
196.
25
9.50
(0.00)
1.34
(0.46)
2.90
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.00)
-3.03
(0.00)
STD
(mone
y)
196.
87
8.29
(0.04)
1.19
(0.43)
2.71
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.00)
-2.84
(0.01)
Notes: *two-tailed confidence level in parentheses;
         ** standard error of estimate in parentheses
The tables reveal that the insignificance of the coefficient estimates in
the pooled data does not persist in the subsamples. Playing list 2 for
prizes, the probabilities of high and outcomes were shown to be impor-
tant in determining risk preference. Playing list 3 for money, however,
revealed that outcomes, expected value and standard deviation were
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important. This evidence offers some support for a commonly recog-
nized motivation for risky choices (as opposed to pricing): probabilities
typically receive greater weight than outcomes (Lichtenstein and Slovic,
1971). The attention paid to probabilities in the games played for prizes,
in contrast to the emphasis on outcomes in games for money, appears
to support this conclusion.
d) Extensions
So far a number of empirical measures of risk aversion have been pre-
sented and discussed. The main conclusion which necessarily follows
from this evidence is that Russian subjects exhibit risk preferences that
are similar to subjects from other countries. In addition, our data con-
firm particular tendencies observed by previous researchers. These in-
clude risk seeking over the small probabilities range in standard lotteries
and risk neutrality thereafter (with a moderate tendency to risk aversion
when measured by buying prices). These patterns contrast with both the
conventional wisdom among economists that risk aversion is more
common and the conclusions of psychologists, like Tversky and Kahne-
man, that risk seeking characterizes low probabilities and risk aversion
characterizes higher ones.
One more possible reason for the discrepancies might be that some
authors that run experiments on choice do not investigate the distribu-
tion of certainty equivalents around their means (or medians). Perhaps
this is due to these authors’ reliance on the law of large numbers,
which, by the way, is only asymptotically valid in finite samples. The
main characteristics of the distributions of our valuations are provided in
Appendix 2, Tables 9 (for standard lotteries) and 10 (for non-standard
lotteries) using both buying and selling prices.
These data suggest that for most lotteries in which the probability of the
high outcome lies in the middle range, certainty equivalents tend to be
normally distributed around their means. However, the distribution of
valuations tends to be skewed in a positive direction for most lotteries
with low probability (below about 0.30), and in a negative direction for
lotteries with high probabilities above about 0.85. These tendencies hold
for both standard and non-standard lotteries, and are even more pro-
nounced in higher scale lotteries of H=1000. These findings presumably
should be interpreted as editing (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or an-
choring of lotteries with low probability high outcomes to L, and with
high probability high outcomes to H. Closer consideration of Table 10
suggests that for non-standard lotteries, positive skewness is more likely
to occur when the lower outcome is nonnegative or when the lottery’s
structure is not easily interpreted, which complicates the editing task.
Distributional patterns of this sort might have important behavioral impli-
cations. Suppose, for instance, that the public assesses the probability
of a good outcome on some investment project to be rather high. Then
the observed pattern implies that many people tend to edit it out to near
certainty, and thus take on an unexpected risk.
RISK ATTITUDES AND CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY
20
This observation raises another question: can observed risk attitudes be
somehow related to the perception of risk? To deal with this potential
problem, we complemented the pairwise choice task in some experi-
ments by asking subjects to indicate which of two lotteries in a pair was
more risky. In order to reduce the bias toward the formal definition, the
subjects were encouraged to make this judgement exclusively on the
basis of their perception. The subjects could, therefore, indicate a pref-
erence for one of four combinations. They might select either the for-
mally-defined safe or risky lotteries, which they had accurately identified
as such. We denote these choices as «conscious.» Or they might prefer
either of the two, having incorrectly identified them according the formal
definition of risk. We denote these choices as «unconscious.» The data
from these sessions are summarized in Table 11 below. Chi-square
tests on the randomness of the unconscious choices are also provided.
Table 11. Consciousness in risky choice
Preference for risk
(χ2)
%
(P)
safety (χ2) %
(P)
Total
(χ2)
%
(P)
Conscious 380 35.0% 480 44.2% 860 79.1%
Unconscious 175 16.1% 52 4.8% 227 20.9%
Total 555 51.1% 532 48.9% 1087 100%
Chi-square,
Prob
55.18 0.00 5.08 0.02 47.40 0.00
Lotteries list 1
Conscious 14 28.0% 17 34.0% 31 62.0%
Unconscious 17 34.0% 2 4.0% 19 38.0%
Total 31 62.0% 19 38.0% 50 100.0%
Chi-square,
Prob
9.32 0.00 0.21 0.65 7.22 0.00
Lotteries list 2
Conscious 120 28.8% 136 32.6% 256 61.4%
Unconscious 127 30.5% 34 8.2% 161 38.6%
Total 247 59.2% 170 40.8% 417 100.0%
Chi-square,
Prob
58.29 0.00 6.08 0.01 62.16 0.00
Lotteries list 3
Conscious 246 39.7% 327 52.7% 573 92.4%
Unconscious 31 5.0% 16 2.6% 47 7.6%
Total 277 44.7% 343 55.3% 620 100.0%
Chi-square,
Prob
3.47 0.06 0.74 0.38 3.56 0.06
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Recall that lotteries in list 1 were denominated in roubles, with probabili-
ties listed as fractions of 36, while list 2 outcomes were recorded in
francs, and probabilities in decimals. These variants did not appear to
influence the nature of risk perception. These outcomes agree with the
pooled patterns. Nearly every individual who prefers the safer option
does so consciously, while about half of all risk-seekers choose the
risky lottery while thinking they preferred the safer prospect. Clearly,
this discrepancy cannot be ascribed to random errors. For list 3 alone,
however the «unconscious» preferences may be ascribed to random
errors for both risk-averters and risk-seekers, although the proportion of
«unconscious» choices was again higher for the latter. This phenomenon
requires more thorough investigation. Our evidence, however, does
point to the conclusion that risk perception is more ‘correct’ when sub-
jects are offered standardized lotteries, which require little or no editing.
In other circumstances, various biases can be expected to emerge.
IV. PUBLIC CHOICE GAMES
We conducted a complementary sequence of experiments relating to
voluntary public good provision, along the lines of the work by Marwell
and Ames (1979) and followed by Isaac et al. (1984), and Kim and
Walker (1984). In the simplest version of these experiments, individuals
are arranged in groups and asked to split some endowment T (which we
set equal to 10 experimental francs) into two parts. One of these parts
will be placed in a private account, which generates an income of 1 per
1 unit invested. Another part goes into a public account, which gener-
ates a smaller income (say, 0.3 per 1 unit invested). This rate is called
the marginal per capita return (MPCR). Formally, each individual’s pay-
off X in each investment period may be written as
Xi = [T-ti] + g(∑i ti)
where ti is individual contribution to public account, g is the (linear) pub-
lic good production function (set at g=0.3∑i ti in our experiments), and
the summation is performed over the range of subjects in the group. An
individual’s income from their private account is thus shown by the ex-
pression in the square brackets (which, in the generalized case, might
also be multiplied by a real constant). A unit deposited into an individ-
ual’s account will produce a greater payoff to that individual than one in-
vested in the public account. Investments in the latter, however, will be
shared by all and, are thus, a public good. Thus, even though setting
ti=T may be the socially efficient strategy (which is the case when the
amount in the public account exceeds by 10/3 the amount of a single
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individual’s endowment), the equilibrium contribution to the public ac-
count is zero so long as MPCR<1.10
Nevertheless, Marwell and Ames found from their experiments that
about ½ of T was contributed to the public good. This unexpectedly high
rate increased when the group was informed that one of its members
had an MPCR above unity. It did not vary, however, with the size of the
endowment, the group size, their level of experience, or the MPCR.
However, Isaac et al., as well as Kim and Walker have shown that con-
tributions to the public account decrease rather rapidly when the game
is repeated, although it never fully reaches the equilibrium value of zero.
Additional findings include the public contribution increasing with the
MPCR, pre-play communication and (somewhat surprisingly) group size.
In view of the fact that our experiments are probably the first run in Rus-
sia in this field, we used the simple public choice design described
above. From a number of possible treatment variables (see Ledyard,
1995 for a reference list), we focused on the effects of pre-play com-
munication and gender. From our seven groups, three were allowed to
engage in pre-play communication. These sessions lasted six periods,
and the revealed contribution trend was quite strong. In the other four
sessions, play lasted for ten periods, and no communication was al-
lowed. Four of our sessions were run at MSU (the three communication
sessions, and the remaining one, without communication, was run with
HSE students), two in HSE and one in MIIT. Aside from the gender
composition of the groups, the other parameters in the experiments
were held equal. The groups’ size was set at 8 inexperienced subjects,
their MPCR was fixed at 0.3; all shared identical initial endowments of
10 francs per period per subject (1 franc worth 100 roubles, so that the
full endowment for the game was of 10,000 roubles11); and information
was distributed symmetrically among the players. All players were also
provided with and shown how to use the same MPCR tables.
The contribution rates, which are shown in Figure 3, suggest two con-
clusions. First, the effect of pre-play communications is clearly pro-
nounced. The average contribution rates for the three communication
sessions were 0.87, 0.95 and 0.88. On the other hand, the groups
playing under the non-communication regime turned up smaller average
contribution rates of 0.28, 0.31, 0.71 and 0.39.
                                               
10 The first-order conditions of maximization of expected payoff for each bidders
gives g’(∑iti)=1, where g’(.) is MPCR. At any g’(∑iti)<1, the equilibrium contribu-
tion rate t is zero. Moreover, since the income from public account g(∑iti) is the
same for every member of the group, putting money in that account would be ef-
ficient if Ng’(∑iti)>1. These two conditions define 1/N<g’(∑iti)<1 and describe
when free-riding is profitable.
11 For organizational reasons, two of seven groups (one from MIIT and the other
from MSU) played for non-monetary prizes. This difference is unlikely to be re-
sponsible for any of the variation in the experiment’s results, since the responses
from these two groups were in line with those from others.
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@The second noteworthy finding is that contribution rates under the
non-communication regime rose with the percentage of female partici-
pants in the group. The gender composition of the group did not appear
to influence contributions when players were allowed to communicate.
But under the no communication regime, the smallest average contribu-
tion of a single person in an all-female group was 50%, which was
greater than the highest average contribution in an all-male group. This
finding is not well-documented in Western literature. Few works have
dealt with the effect of gender on contribution rates. «[T]he question
remains open» (Ledyard, 1995, p.161). Our data are suggestive of a co-
operative attitude among Russian women. In other words, they appear
less inclined to free-ride. An alternative explanation might be that fe-
males are just more careless than males in their expenditure decisions.
Testing these alternative hypotheses would not appear to be too diffi-
cult.
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Figure 3. Public choice games
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Some other interesting observations can be made with respect to this
evidence. No group ever produced the equilibrium contribution of zero.
This finding contradicts game theoretic wisdom but coincides with
Western experimental evidence. The contribution rates of the subjects in
our experiments decreased less rapidly than those of non-Russian sub-
jects that took part in similar experiments elsewhere. Gender differences
also emerged after a temporary (single-period) decrease in the returns
from public investment. Male subjects typically increased their private
investment, whereas females put even more into public account. In
mixed gender groups, female subjects typically also began by contrib-
uting at a high rate to the public account, but when faced with the low
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level of cooperation from the male members of the group, they reverted
to contribution rates that were less than those of purely female groups
(the average contribution rate of female participants from a group com-
posed of equal numbers of males and females was only 0.36). This
finding is suggestive of a social experience effect. That is, irrespective
of initial bids (that may have been a function of prior beliefs and per-
ceptions of the game), most subjects develop contribution rates that
mirror those of others in their groups.
Our evidence also reveals slightly higher contribution rates for risk
seekers than for risk averse subjects in the opening periods of the
game.
* * *
These findings can be complemented by another simple public choice
game, played for real money. A group of 8 advanced undergraduates at
MSU were offered the following choice. At a site in Moscow, they could
buy , for 20,000 roubles, a course packet that included all the assigned
readings for a course. They could also buy the packet from their lec-
turer (namely, myself), if the sum of their independently-written sealed
bids for a copy equaled or exceeded the threshold of 10,000 roubles
times the number of students in the class (which in our case was 80,000
rubles since the class had eight students). If this condition was met,
each student would be asked to pay his or her bid to get a course
packet; otherwise, they would have to procure a copy on their own for
20,000 roubles. Thus, the public good consisted in providing everybody
a journal in a convenient manner and at a smaller cost. Everybody’s bid
was sealed and observed by the experimenter alone, not anybody else
in the group.
This setup defines a different sort of experiment with a threshold as op-
posed to a linear public good production function. The game-theoretic
structure is, therefore, different. Moreover, so long as the journal is
conceived of as desirable (which we presume to be the case), the provi-
sion of the cooperative outcome is socially efficient. If the threshold was
not met, a subject compares ui(W) with ui(W+J-20000-c), where W is
the subject’s wealth, J represents possession of a course packet,
20,000 is its official posted price, and c is the cost of a private ar-
rangement to buy it. On the other hand, if the threshold is met, an indi-
vidual’s payoff is ui(W+J-ti)+fi(10000-ti), where the first term denotes
the private benefit from getting a copy of the course packet, and the
second (the function fi) is the free-riding benefit function, which for
every subject i can be assumed to possess the following properties:
f(0) = 0
f(t>10000) ≤ 0 (i.e., being a victim of free-riding brings non-positive util-
ity)
f(t<10000) ≥ 0 (i.e., being a free-rider brings non-negative utility).
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As an obvious corollary, f(.) can be assumed to be decreasing in t.12
Each subject’s problem is to choose the bid ti that will maximize his of
her utility payoff. The first-order condition for the problem as formulated
yields ui’(.)=-fi’(10000-ti), where the left-hand side must be non-
negative if the purchase of a course packet is desirable. Since non-
positivity of fi’(.) also follows from the properties of the function f(.), the
latter equation can be satisfied. To maximize f(.), ti should be as small
as possible, or the subject should try to free-ride with ti≤10000. Com-
bining this requirement with the threshold provision condition
∑ti≥10000*N, or ti≥10000, we get an obvious focal point of ti=10000
unless ti<20000+c (i.e., the desirability of the public good provision) is
violated, which almost trivially is not the case.
To verbalize this reasoning, knowing the ordinary price of 20,000, the
subjects prefer the public good, but also might try to free-ride and bid
less that the focal bid of 10,000 in the hopes that someone else who
values the course packet will bid an amount greater than 10,000 rou-
bles. In reality, not only nobody bid less than 10,000, but two people bid
more, 12,000 and 15,000 roubles, and thus made explicit provision for
some free-riding. This behavior might be explained by risk aversion, or
the desire to avoid the loss of a desirable public good, since the cost of
purchasing it privately would be 20,000+c. (Note, however, that bidding
over 10,000 does not guarantee the public good’s provision. Apart from
risk aversion, the friendly relationship among subjects like my students
might explain the rather high contribution rates. Supra-equilibrium con-
tributions may not be considered painful when one’s partners are close
acquaintances. This type of behaviorhas been confirmed by the Western
literature as well (Ledyard, 1995).
In sum, our evidence reveals that the contribution rates of Russian sub-
jects to public accounts tends not to be lower than the level found in
other countries. And surprisingly, the rates of Russian females appear to
be systematically higher. Furthermore, close inter-personal relations ap-
pear to enforce commitment to the cooperative outcome even when
subjects may free ride.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Our research here represents an attempt to better understand the ex-
tent of observable differences among peoples and cultures. Although
our experimental evidence is limited, it does suggest that the general
                                               
12 The payoff function for the provisional case may be written in terms of saved
money:  W+J+gi(20000-ti+80000/N-ti) = W+J+gi(30000-2ti), which has a
standard public choice environment structure.
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pattern of risk preferences revealed by Russian subjects does not differ
significantly from that observed in other countries. This evidence might
surprise those who think of Russians as being somehow quite different
and peculiar. Our findings, however, suggest that there are limits to
these similarities. The high contribution rates of Russian women in pub-
lic choice experiments is clearly exceptional. And Russian subjects, in
general, showed a rather unique tendency to anchor their certainty
equivalents to the expected value of lotteries in risky choices. And Rus-
sians also were unusually unlikely to exhibit risk aversion when the prob-
abilities of positive outcomes were high. These differences, at the indi-
vidual level, may well be even greater at the aggregate level. True, one
might argue that because students traditionally comprise one of soci-
ety’s most educated and cosmopolitan groups, their behavior may vary
less across countries than that of countries’ average representative indi-
viduals. But we do not think that an overall similarity of risk attitudes in
Russia and other countries implies that no differences exist between
Russian and Western economic agents. Indeed, if the basic patterns of
individual behavior are to a great extent the same worldwide, then one
could expect that the interactions of these individuals, channeled
through analogous market systems, should lead to the same social out-
comes, at least at the limit. But since this is clearly not the case, it
seems to us that an explanation of cross-country variation should be
sought not in individual behavior but in the patterns and the character of
social interactions within the given economic and social institutions.
But apart from these cultural considerations, a couple of important ob-
servations stem from our discussion. First, our data confirm the findings
of many previous experiments that risk-seeking preferences are not un-
common. This result flies in the face of the near exclusive use of risk-
averse and risk-neutral utility by economic theorists. Our research also
suggests that more research should be conducted on the willingness to
contribute to public goods.
Certainly, our work represents only a small contribution to the rich lit-
erature on individual behavior under uncertainty. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that it convincingly shows that even minor modifications in the in-
stitutional or social environment may affect the perception of economic
phenomena. We hope that the present work sheds some light on the
behavioral patterns in Russia during the transition, and thereby contrib-
utes to the understanding of the microeconomic origins of the current
economic situation.
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APPENDIX 1A. SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR RISKY CHOICE
EXPERIMENT
Ìîñêâà, ______________ 1997 ã.
ÈÍÑÒÐÓÊÖÈß Ó×ÀÑÒÍÈÊÓ ¹_______
Âû ïðèíèìàåòå ó÷àñòèå â ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì ýêñïåðèìåíòå ïî
èíäèâèäóàëüíîìó ïðèíÿòèþ ðåøåíèé â óñëîâèÿõ ðèñêà â ðàìêàõ
ïðîåêòà Ïðîãðàììû Ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ Èññëåäîâàíèé. Çà ó÷àñòèå â
ýêñïåðèìåíòå Âû ïîëó÷èòå ðåàëüíûå äåíüãè. Îäíà ÷àñòü ýòîé
ñóììû ôèêñèðîâàíà: ýòî Âàø ãîíîðàð çà ó÷àñòèå, êîòîðûé Âû
áåçóñëîâíî ïîëó÷èòå ïî îêîí÷àíèè ýêñïåðèìåíòà. Äðóãàÿ ÷àñòü
çàâèñèò êàê îò Âàøèõ äåéñòâèé â õîäå ýêñïåðèìåíòà, òàê è îò âîëè
ñëó÷àÿ. ×åì âíèìàòåëüíåå è òùàòåëüíåå áóäåòå Âû ïðîäóìûâàòü
ñâîè ðåøåíèÿ, òåì âûøå Âàøè øàíñû âûèãðàòü çàìåòíóþ ñóììó
äåíåã, êîòîðóþ Âû ïîëó÷èòå ñåãîäíÿ æå. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, õîòÿ Âû
âîëüíû âûáèðàòü ëþáûå äîïóñòèìûå ðåøåíèÿ, â Âàøèõ
ñîáñòâåííûõ èíòåðåñàõ ñòàðàòüñÿ ïðèíÿòü òå, êîòîðûå Âû ñ÷èòàåòå
íàèëó÷øèìè.
Â ïðîöåññå ýêñïåðèìåíòà âñå äåíåæíûå âåëè÷èíû èçìåðÿþòñÿ íå â
ðåàëüíûõ äåíüãàõ, à â óñëîâíûõ åäèíèöàõ - ôðàíêàõ. Âàø âûèãðûø
â ðóáëÿõ áóäåò ïðÿìî ïðîïîðöèîíàëåí òîìó êîëè÷åñòâó ôðàíêîâ,
êîòîðîå Âû âûèãðàåòå. Âî ôðàíêàõ âûðàæàþòñÿ âñå âîçìîæíûå
âûèãðûøè è ïðîèãðûøè. Ïåðå÷åíü ýòèõ âûèãðûøåé è ïðîèãðûøåé
(èñõîäîâ) âî ôðàíêàõ, ñîâìåñòíî ñ âåðîÿòíîñòÿìè èõ íàñòóïëåíèÿ
(÷èñëà èç îòðåçêà îò 0 äî 1) ìû íàçûâàåì ËÎÒÅÐÅßÌÈ. Òàê, çàïèñü
100, 0.50
0, 0.50…100
(1)……      .0
îçíà÷àåò ëîòåðåþ, îáëàäàòåëü êîòîðîé ïîëó÷èò 100 ôðàíêîâ ñ
âåðîÿòíîñòüþ 1/2, è íå ïîëó÷èò íè÷åãî (ïîëó÷èò 0) òàêæå ñ
âåðîÿòíîñòüþ 1/2. Äëÿ óäîáñòâà âîñïðèÿòèÿ âåðîÿòíîñòè
íàñòóïëåíèÿ èñõîäîâ èçîáðàæàþòñÿ ãðàôè÷åñêè. Åùå ïðèìåð:
çàïèñü
     60, 0.80
    -20, 0.20…60
     (2)……-20
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îçíà÷àåò ëîòåðåþ, îáëàäàòåëü êîòîðîé ïîëó÷èò 60 ôðàíêîâ ñ
âåðîÿòíîñòüþ 0.8, è ïîòåðÿåò (çíàê «-» (ìèíóñ) ïåðåä èñõîäîì) 20
ôðàíêîâ ñ âåðîÿòíîñòüþ 0.2 è ò.ä.
Â õîäå ýêñïåðèìåíòà Âàì íàäî áóäåò âûêàçûâàòü ñâîå
îòíîøåíèå ê òàêîãî ðîäà ëîòåðåÿì, à íåêîòîðûå èç íèõ áóäóò
ðàçûãðàíû, è Âû ïîëó÷èòå èõ èñõîä âî ôðàíêàõ. Ðîçûãðûøè áóäóò
ïðîèçâîäèòüñÿ ïðè ïîìîùè áî÷îíêîâ ñ íîìåðàìè îò 1 äî 100,
êîòîðûå âûíèìàþòñÿ íàóãàä èç íåïðîçðà÷íîãî ìåøêà. Åñëè
âûïàâøèé íîìåð îêàçàëñÿ ìåíüøèì èëè ðàâíûì âåðîÿòíîñòè
íåáëàãîïðèÿòíîãî èñõîäà, òî âûïàäàåò ýòîò èñõîä, ò.å. èñõîäû
ñ÷èòàþòñÿ ïî âîçðàñòàþùåé. Òàê, â ïðèìåðå (2) áî÷îíêè ñ öèôðàìè
îò 1 äî 20 îçíà÷àþò ïîòåðþ 20 ôðàíêîâ, à âñå öèôðû âûøå 21 -
âûèãðûø 60 ôðàíêîâ.
ÅÑÒÜ ËÈ Ó ÂÀÑ ÂÎÏÐÎÑÛ?
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ÒÀÁËÈÖÀ I (ïåðâûé ýòàï)
Âàì ïðåäëàãàåòñÿ 10 ïàð ëîòåðåé (íîìåðà ïàð äàíû â êðàéíåì
ëåâîì ñòîëáöå). Äâå èç êîòîðûõ áóäóò îòîáðàíû ñëó÷àéíûì
îáðàçîì, è Âû ñûãðàåòå â íèõ. Âíèìàòåëüíî èçó÷èòå êàæäóþ ïàðó, è
1) ïîñòàâüòå ãàëî÷êó (√) â ñòðîêå ðÿäîì ñ íîìåðîì òîé ëîòåðåè èç
êàæäîé ïàðû, â êîòîðóþ Âû áû ïðåäïî÷ëè ñûãðàòü (óòâåðæäåíèÿ
«ìíå âñå ðàâíî» íå äîïóñêàþòñÿ), è 2) â ñòðîêå íèæå, ðÿäîì ñî
ñëîâîì ðèñê - ãàëî÷êó (√) íàïðîòèâ òîé ëîòåðåè èç ïàðû, êîòîðóþ
Âû ñ÷èòàåòå áîëåå ðèñêîâàííîé. Èç êàæäîé ïàðû Âû äîëæíû
âûáðàòü îäíó ëîòåðåþ, êîòîðóþ Âû ïðåäïî÷èòàåòå, è îäíó (íå
îáÿçàòåëüíî òó æå ñàìóþ!), êîòîðàÿ êàæåòñÿ Âàì áîëåå
ðèñêîâàííîé.
Êîãäà ýòî ñäåëàíî, âûòÿíèòå íàóãàä äâå èç äåñÿòè ïðåäëîæåííûõ
êàðòî÷åê. ×èñëî íà êàðòå îçíà÷àåò òó ïàðó, êîòîðàÿ Âàì âûïàëà -
îáâåäèòå åå íîìåð êðóæêîì. Âû ñûãðàåòå òó ëîòåðåþ èç êàæäîé èç
âûïàâøèõ ïàð, êîòîðóþ Âû ïðåäïî÷ëè - çàíåñèòå åå èñõîä â ãðàôó
èñõîä ïîñëå ðîçûãðûøà. Ïåðåíåñèòå Âàø âûèãðûø çà ýòîò ýòàï â
ÈÒÎÃÎÂÓÞ ÒÀÁËÈÖÓ íà ñ.3 èíñòðóêöèè è ñäàéòå Òàáëèöó I
âåäóùåìó.
ÒÀÁËÈÖÀ II (âòîðîé ýòàï)
Ó Âàñ åñòü âîçìîæíîñòü ñûãðàòü â òðè èç ñëåäóþùèõ 30 ëîòåðåé,
êîòîðûå ñíîâà áóäóò îòîáðàíû ñëó÷àéíî - ïðè ïîìîùè êàðòî÷åê.
Âíèìàòåëüíî èçó÷èòå êàæäóþ èç ëîòåðåé â ñïèñêå, è íàïèøèòå â
ñâîáîäíîé êëåòî÷êå ñðàçó ñïðàâà îäíî ÷èñëî - - ìàêñèìàëüíóþ
öåíó ïîêóïêè êàæäîé ëîòåðåè, èëè íàèáîëüøóþ ñóììó âî ôðàíêàõ,
êîòîðóþ, Âû ñîãëàñíû çàïëàòèòü çà ïðàâî ñûãðàòü â äàííóþ
ëîòåðåþ. Íàïðèìåð, Âû, âèäèìî, ñîãëàñèòåñü ñûãðàòü â ëîòåðåþ èç
ïðèìåðà (1) çà 0 ôðàíêîâ, ò.å. áåñïëàòíî; ñ äðóãîé ñòîðîíû, Âû
âðÿä ëè ñîãëàñèòåñü çàïëàòèòü çà íåå 100 ôðàíêîâ - ñóììó, ðàâíóþ
ìàêñèìàëüíîìó âîçìîæíîìó âûèãðûøó. Ãäå-òî ïîñåðåäèíå ìåæäó
ýòèìè ÷èñëàìè, âèäèìî, è íàõîäèòñÿ òà ìèíèìàëüíàÿ öåíà, çà
êîòîðóþ Âû êàê ðàç åùå ãîòîâû çàïëàòèòü çà ëîòåðåþ - íàïèøèòå
ýòó öèôðó â êëåòêå ñðàçó ñïðàâà îò ëîòåðåè. (Ïðîäåëàéòå ýòî äëÿ
ëîòåðåé èç ñëåäóþùåé òàáëèöû)
¹ Ëîòåðåÿ Ìàêñèìàëüíàÿ öåíà
ïîêóïêè
Öåíà
ïðåäëîæåíèÿ
Âûèãð
ûø
1 100, 0.50
0, 0.50
2 90, 0.75;
-10, 0.25
3 110, 0.3;
-25, 0.7
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Ïîñëå òîãî, êàê Âû îïðåäåëèòå ýòè öåíû, Âû âûòÿíèòå òðè êàðòî÷êè
è îòáåðåòå òðè ëîòåðåè èç ïîëíîãî ñïèñêà - îáâåäèòå èõ íîìåðà
êðóæêàìè. Çàòåì ïðè ïîìîùè òàáëèöû ñëó÷àéíûõ ÷èñåë (ñ ÷èñëàìè
îò 01 äî 99) âåäóùèé ñëó÷àéíûì îáðàçîì îïðåäåëèò äëÿ íèõ öåíó
ïðåäëîæåíèÿ, ò.å. òó ñóììó, çà êîòîðóþ îí ñîãëàñèòñÿ ïðîäàòü Âàì
êàæäóþ èç îòîáðàííûõ ëîòåðåé. Íàïðèìåð, åñëè ïî òàáëèöå âûïàëî
÷èñëî 23, çíà÷èò öåíà ïðåäëîæåíèÿ ðàâíà 23 ôðàíêàì - çàïèøèòå
åå â ãðàôå öåíà ïðåäëîæåíèÿ.
Åñëè âûïàâøàÿ öåíà ïðåäëîæåíèÿ îêàçàëàñü ìåíüøå èëè ðàâíîé
íàçâàííîé Âàìè öåíû ïîêóïêè, òî Âû ïîêóïàåòå ëîòåðåþ çà ýòó
âûïàâøóþ öåíó, è èãðàåòå åå, çàïèñàâ â ãðàôó âûèãðûø ðàçíîñòü
ìåæäó åå èñõîäîì è öåíîé ïðåäëîæåíèÿ. Ïðåäïîëîæèì, ÷òî â
ïðèìåðå (1) Âû áãîòîâû êóïèòü ëîòåðåþ çà 40 ôðàíêîâ. Òàê êàê
ïðîäàæíàÿ öåíà 23 íèæå 40, Âû êóïèëè ýòó ëîòåðåþ. Ïóñòü åå èñõîä
îêàçàëñÿ 100 ôðàíêîâ - òîãäà Âàø âûèãðûø ðàâåí åå èñõîäó (100
ôðàíêîâ), çà âû÷åòîì öåíû ïðåäëîæåíèÿ (23 ôðàíêà), ò.å. 77
ôðàíêîâ - ýòà ñóììà çàíîñèòñÿ â ãðàôó âûèãðûø. Åñëè æå öåíà
ïðåäëîæåíèÿ îêàçàëàñü áîëüøå Âàøåé öåíû ïîêóïêè, òî Âû íå
ïîêóïàåòå ëîòåðåþ, íå ïëàòèòå íè÷åãî, è â ãðàôå âûèãðûø ïèøåòå
0.
Â Âàøèõ ñîáñòâåííûõ èíòåðåñàõ êàê ìîæíî áîëåå àêêóðàòíî è òî÷íî
îïðåäåëÿòü ìàêñèìàëüíóþ öåíó ïîêóïêè, òàê êàê åñëè Âàøà îöåíêà
íåäîñòàòî÷íî òî÷íà, òî Âû óïóñòèòå ÷àñòü âîçìîæíîãî âûèãðûøà.
Ïóñòü Âàøà èñòèííàÿ îöåíêà ëîòåðåè (2) ðàâíà 44 ôðàíêàì, à Âû
íàçâàëè ìåíüøóþ öåíó â 35. Òîãäà åñëè öåíà ïðåäëîæåíèÿ ïîïàäåò
â èíòåðâàë ìåæäó 36 è 43, òî Âû íå ñìîæåòå êóïèòü ëîòåðåþ ïî
öåíå, êîòîðàÿ íèæå Âàøåé ãîòîâíîñòè çàïëàòèòü. Íàïðîòèâ, åñëè
Âû íàçâàëè öåíó 51, ÷òî âûøå Âàøåé èñòèííîé îöåíêè, òî ïðè öåíå
ïðåäëîæåíèÿ îò 45 äî 51 Âû êóïèòå ëîòåðåþ, çàïëàòèâ çà íåå
áîëüøå Âàøåé èñòèííîé îöåíêè. Ïîýòîìó, îïðåäåëÿÿ öåíû ïîêóïêè,
Âû äîëæíû áûòü ìàêñèìàëüíî àêêóðàòíûìè. Ïîìíèòå: òðè ëîòåðåè
áóäóò ñëó÷àéíûì îáðàçîì îòîáðàíû èç ïîëíîãî ñïèñêà, è Âû
ïîëó÷èòå èëè èõ èñõîäû çà âû÷åòîì öåíû ïðåäëîæåíèÿ, èëè íè÷åãî!
Ïåðåíåñèòå Âàøè âûèãðûøè çà âòîðîé ýòàï â ÈÒÎÃÎÂÓÞ ÒÀÁËÈÖÓ,
è ñäàéòå Òàáëèöó II âåäóùåìó.
ÈÒÎÃÎÂÀß ÒÀÁËÈÖÀ
Çà ïåðâûé ýòàï
(Òàáëèöà I)
Çà âòîðîé ýòàï (Òàáëèöà
II)
ÂÑÅÃÎ ÇÀ ÈÃÐÓ
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APPENDIX 1B NONSTANDARD LOTTERIES LISTS
LIST 1: Roubles
H Prob L Prob EV STD
L1 4000 35/36 -1000 1/36 3861.1 821.678
M1 16000 11/36 -1500 25/36 3847.2 8061.241
L2 2000 29/36 -1000 7/36 1416.7 1187.317
M2 9000 7/36 -500 29/36 1347.2 3759.838
L3 3000 35/36 -2000 2/36 2805.6 1049.324
M3 6500 18/36 -1000 18/36 2750.0 3750.000
L4 4000 32/36 -500 4/36 3500.0 1414.214
M4 40000 4/36 -1000 32/36 3555.6 12885.057
L5 2500 34/36 -500 2/36 2333.3 687.184
M5 8500 14/36 -1500 22/36 2388.9 4874.980
L6 2000 33/36 -2000 3/36 1666.7 1105.542
M6 5000 18/36 -1500 18/36 1750.0 3250.000
L7 4000 32/36 0 4/36 3555.6 1257.079
M7 21000 6/36 0 30/36 3500.0 7826.238
L8 5000 30/36 -1000 6/36 4000.0 2236.068
M8 30000 10/36 -6000 26/36 4000.0 16124.515
L9 6000 24/36 -2000 12/36 3333.3 3771.236
M9 10000 16/36 -2000 20/36 3333.3 5962.848
L10 2000 30/36 -500 6/36 1583.3 931.695
M10 11000 8/36 -1000 28/36 1666.7 4988.877
RISK ATTITUDES AND CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY
34
LIST 2: Experimental Francs
H p L 1-p EV STD
L1 90 0.8 -10 0.2 70.0 40.000
M1 360 0.2 0 0.8 72.0 144.000
L2 67 0.6 -30 0.4 28.2 47.520
M2 200 0.2 -15 0.8 28.0 86.000
L3 80 0.9 -15 0.1 70.5 28.500
M3 240 0.3 -5 0.7 68.5 112.273
L4 50 0.5 -20 0.5 15.0 35.000
M4 250 0.1 -10 0.9 16.0 78.000
L5 28 0.9 -100 0.1 15.2 38.400
M5 125 0.2 -12 0.8 15.4 54.800
L6 80 0.5 -24 0.5 28.0 52.000
M6 135 0.3 -18 0.7 27.9 70.113
L7 60 0.8 -5 0.2 47.0 26.000
M7 160 0.3 -1 0.7 47.3 73.779
L8 55 0.9 -30 0.1 46.5 25.500
M8 120 0.4 -5 0.6 45.0 61.237
L9 70 0.7 -12 0.3 45.4 37.577
M9 120 0.4 -5 0.6 45.0 61.237
L10 50 0.8 -50 0.2 30.0 40.000
M10 100 0.4 -20 0.6 28.0 58.788
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LIST 3: Experimental Francs
H p L 1-p EV STD
L1 50 0.75 10 0.25 40.0 17.321
M1 100 0.40 0 0.60 40.0 48.990
L2 100 0.70 0 0.30 70.0 45.826
M2 150 0.45 -1 0.55 67.0 75.122
L3 55 0.80 5 0.20 45.0 20.000
M3 100 0.45 0 0.55 45.0 49.749
L4 100 0.60 0 0.40 60.0 48.990
M4 180 0.35 -5 0.65 59.8 88.239
L5 50 0.90 25 0.10 47.5 7.500
M5 100 0.50 0 0.50 50.0 50.000
L6 100 0.65 0 0.35 65.0 47.697
M6 180 0.40 -10 0.60 66.0 93.081
L7 45 0.75 5 0.25 35.0 17.321
M7 100 0.35 0 0.65 35.0 47.697
L8 100 0.75 0 0.25 75.0 43.301
M8 170 0.45 -3 0.55 74.9 86.066
L9 35 0.85 0 0.15 29.8 12.497
M9 100 0.30 0 0.70 30.0 45.826
L10 100 0.55 0 0.45 55.0 49.749
M10 180 0.30 -1 0.70 53.3 82.945
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Table 2. Regression output for individuals CE/EV ratios
Dependent Variable: CETOEV
……………………..Multiple R: .568
Multiple R-Square: .323
……………………  ….Adjusted R-
Square: .293
Number of cases: 1160 F(49,1110)=10.81 …p<0.000
Standard Error of Estimate: 1.119 ……….Intercept:1.334
Std.Error:.116 t(1110)=11.513 …p<0.000
Regressor bi St. error t-value Prob
Intercpt 1.334 3.698 11.513 0.000
SCALE -0.095 0.063 -1.521 0.129
PROB05 2.288 0.174 13.186 0.000
PROB10 1.241 0.174 7.149 0.000
PROB15 0.422 0.174 2.433 0.015
PROB20 0.006 0.174 0.032 0.974
PROB25 -0.053 0.174 -0.305 0.760
PROB30 -0.054 0.174 -0.312 0.755
PROB35 -0.159 0.174 -0.915 0.361
PROB40 -0.193 0.174 -1.115 0.265
PROB45 -0.211 0.174 -1.214 0.225
PROB50 -0.177 0.174 -1.020 0.308
PROB55 -0.274 0.174 -1.582 0.114
PROB60 -0.250 0.174 -1.440 0.150
PROB65 -0.303 0.174 -1.747 0.081
PROB70 -0.329 0.174 -1.899 0.058
PROB75 -0.331 0.174 -1.907 0.057
PROB80 -0.324 0.174 -1.869 0.062
PROB85 -0.348 0.174 -2.008 0.045
PROB90 -0.323 0.174 -1.861 0.063
PROB95 -0.319 0.174 -1.836 0.067
PROB99 -0.307 0.174 -1.771 0.077
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Table 3. T-statistics for mean differences between unit and observable
CE/EV ratios
Vari-
able
Mean Standar
d
deviatio
n
t p Variable Mean Stand
ard
deviati
on
t p
4.269 3.698 -4.760 0.000 p1000-05 3.315 3.698 -2.879 0.008
P10 P05 1.990 -4.479 0.000 p1000-10 2.635 2.483 -3.546 0.001
P15 1.768 1.253 -3.300 0.003 p1000-15 1.730 1.255 -3.132 0.004
P20 1.617 0.861 -3.859 0.001 p1000-20 0.968 0.653 0.262 0.795
P25 1.417 0.772 -2.906 0.007 p1000-25 1.041 0.587 -0.374 0.711
P30 1.363 0.763 -2.565 0.016 p1000-30 1.091 0.600 -0.820 0.419
P35 1.224 0.471 -2.558 0.016 p1000-35 1.002 0.460 -0.024 0.981
P40 1.122 0.470 -1.404 0.171 p1000-40 1.027 0.489 -0.299 0.767
P45 1.081 0.449 -0.975 0.338 p1000-45 1.031 0.487 -0.339 0.737
P50 1.106 0.363 -1.577 0.126 p1000-50 1.079 0.367 -1.164 0.254
P55 0.981 0.380 0.267 0.792 p1000-55 0.991 0.414 0.117 0.907
P60 0.977 0.375 0.330 0.744 p1000-60 1.049 0.392 -0.671 0.508
P65 0.871 0.328 2.117 0.043 p1000-65 1.038 0.771 -0.269 0.790
P70 0.901 0.305 1.747 0.092 p1000-70 0.951 0.322 0.825 0.417
P75 0.891 0.275 2.122 0.043 p1000-75 0.957 0.239 0.964 0.343
P80 0.919 0.275 1.597 0.122 p1000-80 0.945 0.316 0.944 0.353
P85 0.875 0.238 2.831 0.008 p1000-85 0.936 0.285 1.217 0.234
P90 0.885 0.242 2.558 0.016 p1000-90 0.981 0.141 0.717 0.480
P95 0.926 0.199 2.002 0.055 p1000-95 0.950 0.173 1.566 0.129
P99 0.933 0.132 2.724 0.011 p1000-99 0.967 0.091 1.932 0.064
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Table 4. T-statistics for mean differences between unit and observable
CE/EV ratios, estimated using buying prices revealed under monetary
incentives only
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
t p
P05 1.020 0.727 -0.087 0.933
P10 0.850 0.576 0.824 0.431
P15 0.680 0.446 2.267 0.050
P20 1.160 0.961 -0.527 0.611
P25 0.708 0.521 1.773 0.110
P30 0.953 0.778 0.190 0.854
P35 0.677 0.384 2.662 0.026
P40 0.830 0.416 1.292 0.228
P45 1.038 0.509 -0.235 0.820
P50 1.148 0.415 -1.127 0.289
P55 0.849 0.384 1.243 0.245
P60 0.912 0.321 0.870 0.407
P65 0.912 0.299 0.927 0.378
P70 0.983 0.328 0.165 0.872
P75 0.929 0.282 0.792 0.449
P80 0.963 0.189 0.627 0.546
P85 0.859 0.259 1.724 0.119
P90 0.790 0.270 2.458 0.036
P95 0.840 0.218 2.321 0.045
P99 0.880 0.197 1.934 0.085
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Table 5. T-statistics for mean differences between unit and observable
CE/EV ratios, estimated using buying prices revealed under monetary
and prizes incentives.
Variable Mean Standard
deviation.
t p
P05 2.770 4.690 -1.961 0.060
P10 1.333 2.023 -0.855 0.399
P15 1.372 1.614 -1.200 0.240
P20 1.207 1.065 -1.011 0.321
P25 1.016 0.931 -0.090 0.928
P30 1.121 0.791 -0.797 0.432
P35 0.866 0.643 1.076 0.291
P40 0.939 0.418 0.747 0.461
P45 1.007 0.465 -0.082 0.934
P50 1.020 0.324 -0.319 0.751
P55 0.843 0.359 2.270 0.031
P60 0.966 0.306 0.575 0.570
P65 0.889 0.287 2.000 0.055
P70 0.862 0.337 2.118 0.043
P75 0.898 0.242 2.181 0.038
P80 0.979 0.171 0.617 0.542
P85 0.848 0.192 4.078 0.000
P90 0.856 0.216 3.430 0.002
P95 0.860 0.179 4.034 0.000
P99 0.908 0.141 3.358 0.002
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Table 9. Characteristics of distributions of certainty equivalents, stan-
dard lotteries
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selling prices, scale 100
P05 25.100 19.281 30.919 20 10 38 18.194 0.584 0.374 -0.560 0.733
P10 27.125 20.985 33.265 20 13 40 19.200 1.406 0.374 2.530 0.733
P15 30.225 23.892 36.558 25 20 45 19.801 1.392 0.374 2.342 0.733
P20 30.000 24.036 35.964 30 15 40 18.649 0.977 0.374 0.783 0.733
P25 45.180 36.114 54.245 40 25 60 27.965 0.713 0.378 -0.623 0.741
P30 41.275 34.830 47.720 40 30 55 20.153 0.541 0.374 0.006 0.733
P35 44.675 38.512 50.838 40 30 53 19.272 1.355 0.374 3.231 0.733
P40 45.050 39.605 50.495 40 40 50 17.025 0.290 0.374 0.816 0.733
P45 51.525 44.824 58.226 50 40 58 20.952 0.977 0.374 2.791 0.733
P50 56.725 51.176 62.274 50 50 60 17.352 1.291 0.374 1.152 0.733
P55 55.350 48.606 62.094 55 45 60 21.088 0.439 0.374 0.824 0.733
P60 60.125 53.497 66.753 60 50 70 20.726 -0.316 0.374 0.241 0.733
P65 57.143 50.623 63.662 60 50 65 20.384 0.071 0.374 0.279 0.733
P70 62.475 55.661 69.289 67 50 80 21.306 -0.111 0.374 -0.714 0.733
P75 64.150 56.631 71.669 65 60 78 23.511 -0.838 0.374 0.478 0.733
P80 76.525 68.472 84.578 80 73 100 25.180 -1.340 0.374 1.210 0.733
P85 60.525 50.960 70.090 68 40 90 29.907 -0.443 0.374 -1.016 0.733
P90 78.448 71.809 85.086 85 70 90 20.758 -1.588 0.374 2.554 0.733
P95 84.650 77.899 91.401 93 83 98 21.108 -2.035 0.374 3.879 0.733
P99 89.850 84.519 95.181 99 90 100 16.668 -1.896 0.374 2.507 0.733
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selling prices, scale 1000
P1000-05 165.759 83.400 248.117 100 50 135 216.517 2.828 0.434 8.371 0.845
P1000-10 263.483 169.039 357.927 150 100 395 248.289 1.637 0.434 2.417 0.845
P1000-15 259.483 187.878 331.088 200 150 300 188.245 1.676 0.434 3.661 0.845
P1000-20 193.655 143.989 243.321 200 100 250 130.570 1.113 0.434 2.000 0.845
P1000-25 260.207 204.363 316.051 250 150 300 146.812 0.698 0.434 1.781 0.845
P1000-30 327.414 258.914 395.914 300 200 400 180.082 1.152 0.434 2.932 0.845
P1000-35 350.724 289.471 411.978 330 270 400 161.033 0.614 0.434 1.911 0.845
P1000-40 410.862 336.462 485.262 400 300 475 195.595 0.933 0.434 2.352 0.845
P1000-45 463.793 380.398 547.189 450 400 500 219.242 0.762 0.434 1.871 0.845
P1000-50 539.655 469.860 609.450 500 430 650 183.488 0.069 0.434 0.981 0.845
P1000-55 545.035 458.444 631.625 550 400 600 227.642 0.388 0.434 0.317 0.845
P1000-60 629.310 539.855 718.766 650 500 710 235.174 -0.601 0.434 0.570 0.845
P1000-65 675.000 484.335 865.665 600 500 700 501.248 3.678 0.434 17.364 0.845
P1000-70 665.517 579.854 751.180 700 600 800 225.204 -1.093 0.434 1.304 0.845
P1000-75 717.931 649.776 786.086 750 700 800 179.177 -1.261 0.434 2.277 0.845
P1000-80 755.690 659.536 851.843 800 700 900 252.784 -1.269 0.434 2.124 0.845
P1000-85 795.345 703.341 887.349 900 700 935 241.875 -1.771 0.434 2.767 0.845
P1000-90 883.069 834.677 931.461 900 800 950 127.221 -1.688 0.434 2.872 0.845
P1000-95 902.207 839.672 964.742 960 850 1000 164.401 -3.076 0.434 11.700 0.845
P1000-99 957.617 923.282 991.952 1000 900 1000 90.265 -2.753 0.434 8.450 0.845
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buying prices, scale 100
P05 5.100 2.500 7.700 5 1 5 3.635 0.681 0.687 0.440 1.334
P10 8.500 4.380 12.620 10 1 10 5.759 0.506 0.687 0.531 1.334
P15 10.200 5.410 14.991 10 5 14 6.697 0.239 0.687 -0.866 1.334
P20 23.200 9.457 36.943 18 10 23 19.211 1.836 0.687 3.869 1.334
P25 17.700 8.385 27.015 10 10 18 13.022 1.735 0.687 2.096 1.334
P30 28.600 11.897 45.303 20 15 33 23.349 2.365 0.687 6.272 1.334
P35 23.700 14.096 33.304 20 10 28 13.425 1.034 0.687 0.192 1.334
P40 33.200 21.297 45.103 38 10 41 16.639 -0.076 0.687 -0.865 1.334
P45 46.700 30.300 63.100 41 25 50 22.925 0.851 0.687 0.401 1.334
P50 57.400 42.550 72.250 50 40 65 20.759 0.958 0.687 -1.014 1.334
P55 46.700 31.600 61.800 43 30 59 21.108 0.567 0.687 -0.748 1.334
P60 54.700 40.923 68.477 54 35 68 19.259 0.445 0.687 -0.700 1.334
P65 59.300 45.388 73.212 55 40 65 19.448 1.060 0.687 0.759 1.334
P70 68.800 52.384 85.216 67 50 85 22.948 0.150 0.687 -1.354 1.334
P75 69.700 54.566 84.834 68 50 81 21.156 0.315 0.687 -1.131 1.334
P80 77.000 66.177 87.823 78 60 88 15.129 -0.328 0.687 -0.336 1.334
P85 73.000 57.255 88.745 80 40 85 22.010 -0.739 0.687 -0.474 1.334
P90 71.100 53.706 88.494 69 50 90 24.315 -0.127 0.687 -1.052 1.334
P95 79.800 64.986 94.614 88 55 96 20.709 -0.580 0.687 -1.282 1.334
P99 87.100 73.182 101.018 93 70 99 19.456 -2.171 0.687 4.795 1.334
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